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1955] COMMENTS lll 
LABOR LAW - CERTIFIED UNION'S Loss OF MAJORITY STATUS 
DURING CERTIFICATION YEAR AND WITHOUT FAULT OF EMPLOYER 
AS JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSAL TO BARGAIN -The "one year certi-
fication rule" was originated in the early years of the National 
Labor Relations Board and has been consistently applied by it.1 
Essentially it provides that after certification an employer is re-
quired to bargain with the certified union for a reasonable time, 
which is usually one yea:r2 in the absence of "unusual circum-
stances." The certified union is conclusively presumed to repre-
sent a majority of employees in the unit for that period, the pre-
sumption afterward becoming rebuttable.3 This system of succes-
sive conclusive and rebuttable presumptions represents a compro-
mise between the competing policies of giving a union time to 
establish a workable bargaining relation with the employer free 
from outside pressures and allowing a majority of employees to 
be represented by the bargaining agent of their own choice. 
It is well established that if the employer causes the union to 
lose its majority standing by the commission of unfair labor prac-
tices, such as intimidating or interrogating employees or assisting 
the organizational efforts of an outside union, the loss of majority 
status by the inside union is no defense to an unfair labor practice 
charge of refusal to bargain.4 This same principle holds true where 
the only sin of the employer is his refusal to bargain and the loss of 
1 Whittier Mills Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 457 (1939); Appalachian Electric Power Co., 47 
N.L.R.B. 821 (1943); Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944); Mengel Co., 80 
N.L.R.B. 705 (1948); Sexton Welding Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 344 (1952); Ray Brooks, 98 
N.L.R.B. 976 (1952); Henry Heide, 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954). 
2 While stated in terms of a "reasonable period," one year is almost automatically 
found "reasonable." But in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 253 (1951), 
eleven months and one week was found to be a "reasonable time," the Board saying that 
what is reasonable will depend upon the facts of the particular case. 
3 Toolcraft Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 655 (1950). 
4 NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S.Ct. 918 (1940); Medo Photo 
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944); Dallas Concrete Co., 102 
N.L.R.B. 1292 (1953). 
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majority status occurs, subsequent to that refusal.5 This is simply 
because the loss of majority status subsequent to the commision 
of the admitted unfair refusal to bargain is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether an order against the unfair practice should be 
issued or enforced, as the case may be. 
The one year certification rule is used to find that a refusal 
to barga1n is itself an unfair labor practice. In the two situations 
just noted, however, the rule is not needed, for the existence of 
the unfair practice can be established independently of it. The 
only instance in which the rule is applied is when the employer 
refuses to bargain with a certified union after a majority of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit have repudiated it of their own 
free will and without the intervention of the employer. The 
Board has consistently applied the rule to find such a refusal an 
unfair labor practice,6 and this has generally,7 though not uni-
formly,8 been upheld by the courts. The Supreme Court has re-
cently approved the rule in this context.9 It is the writer's opinion 
that this application of the rule is questionable. 
I. Analysis of Arguments in Support of the Rule 
Basically, four arguments are urged on behalf of the rule. (1) 
When Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act in 
1947 to allow employees to petition for decertification, it limited 
such elections to one per year. This formal method for revocation 
of a union's bargaining authority became the only way for employ-
ees to withdraw the union's power to represent them.10 It is argued 
5 Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817 (1944); NLRB v. P. Loril-
lard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 62 S.CL 397 (1942); International Assn. of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 
U.S. 72, 61 S.CL 83 (1940); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 73 S.Ct. 826 (1950). 
The Board recognizes that there may be factors other than the refusal to bargain contribu-
ting to defection from the union, but it will not try to "disentangle" them. NLRB v. 
Andrew Jergens Co., (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 130. 
6 Botany Worsted Mills, 41 N.L.R.B. 218 (1942); Vulcan Forging Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 621 
(1949); cases cited in note I supra. 
7 NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, (3d Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 876; NLRB v. Brooks, 
(9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 899; NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co., (4th Cir. 1944) 140 F. 
(2d) 217; NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, (5th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 350; NLRB v. Henry 
Heide, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 46. 
s NLRB v. Vulcan Forging Co., (6th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 927; Mid-Continent Pe-
troleum Corp. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 613; NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising 
Co., (4th Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 244. See also NLRB v. Poultry Enterprises, Inc., (5th Cir. 
1953) 207 F. (2d) 522; NLRB v. Prudential Ins. Co., (6th Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 385. 
9 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954). 
10 NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, (5th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 350; NLRB v. Mexia 
Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 70 S.CL 826 (1950); Bishop, McCormick and Bishop, 102 
N.L.R.B. 1101 (1953); United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950); Brooks v. 
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct 176 (1954). 
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that if an informal repudiation, as by a petition signed by a ma-
jority of employees, could have the same effect as a decertification 
election, the limitation on the use of the decertification procedure 
would become meaningless. But this argument proves too much. 
Employees can petition for a decertification election if a union is 
"certified or is currently recognized by their employer."11 It has 
been held that if the members of a recognized but non-certified 
union informally revoke the union's bargaining authority, an 
employer does not violate section 8 (a) (5) by refusing to bargain 
with it thereafter.12 Thus in a case where Congress expressly al-
lowed the use of a decertification proceeding, it is not the only 
method of withdrawing a union's authority. Also, the Board, 
can, on request or on its own motion, revoke its prior certification 
without conducting a decertification election.13 Further, the one 
year certification rule itself provides that an employer can law-
fully refuse to bargain with a certified union within the certifica-
tion year if there are "unusual circumstances" present.14 It is, 
therefore, apparent that Congress, the NLRB, or the courts do 
not require the formal decertification proceeding to revoke a 
union's authority in every case where it might be used. The logical 
inference is that other valid ways of withdrawing representative 
authority from a union, even a certified union, are available to 
the employees. 
(2) A Board-supervised secret ballot best indicates the free 
choice of the employees, and, it is argued, a non-supervised, public, 
and informal petition should not be allowed to nullify it.15 But in 
11 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 144, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159 
( c)(l )(A)(ii) (italics supplied). 
12 NLRB v. Mayer, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 286; NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain 
Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 144. 
13Telegraph Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1173 (1953); TELLER, LABoR DISPUTES AND 
COLLECfIVE BARGAINING §398.109 (Supp. 1950). 
14 "Unusual circumstances" have been found only infrequently, and none since 1947. 
NLRB v. Henry Heide, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 46. Unusual circumstances were found 
when the certified union had been dissolved within the certification year [Public Service 
Electric and Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944)] and where by a "collective, formal effort" 
on the part of employees there was affiliation with another union after a local schism. 
Carson, Pirie Scott and Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946); Jasper Wood Products, Inc., 72 
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1947). Extreme reduction of personnel is not of itself an unusual circum-
stance. Bethlehem Steel Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 277 (1947). Nor is the filing of a certification or 
decertification petition. NLRB v. Henry Heide, supra. In view of the infrequence of the 
finding of unusual circumstances, the exception may now be academic. But see Member 
Murdock's concurring opinion in Henry Heide, 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954), in which it is 
suggested that the exception should not be so narrowly confined as it has been in the past. 
15 Lift Trucks, 75 N.L.R.B. 998 (1948); NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, (3d Cir. 1943) 
133 F. (2d) 876; Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944); Ray Brooks, 98 N.L.R.B. 
976 (1952). Bishop, McCormick and Bishop, 102 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1953), although an extreme 
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the cases where the one year certification rule is necessary to find 
an unlawful refusal to bargain, it is assumed that the repudiation 
is not the result of pressure on the employees, but that it is in fact 
the free choice of a majority of the employees. If the employer 
instigates the defection, such activity itself can be found to be an 
unfair labor practice without resort to the one year rule,16 and 
the remedial order to bargain can be enforced whether or not 
the union represents a majority of employees when the order is 
issued or enforced.17 The Board has been alert to detect subtle 
pressures in other contexts, and its expertise should be adequate 
to determine whether the informal repudiation represents the 
free choice of the employees. 
(3) It is said that doing away with the rule would encourage 
employers to delay bargaining in the hope that the union would 
lose its majority status, thereby relieving the employer of the obli-
gation to bargain.18 However, the employer is required "to bar-
gain in good faith,"19 and this elastic concept can be easily stretched 
to cover a multitude of sins, including dilatory and insincere 
tactics. If the union does in fact represent a majority of employees 
in the bargaining unit when the employer engages in stalling tac-
tics, such stalling then is an unfair labor practice. 20 In such a 
case, the one year certification rule is not needed; the violation of 
section 8 (a) (5) exists independently of it and an order to bargain 
can be enforced even though the union has lost the support of a 
majority of employees after the employer's commission of the un-
fair labor practice.21 
It may be conceded that abandoning the rule will encourage 
some employers to drag their feet in bargaining. But machinery 
for remedying and discouraging this is available in the "good 
faith bargaining" requirement. Admittedly this would require 
litigation of each case to determine the bona £ides of the employer. 
It is arguable, however, that this burden of increased litigation 
case, exemplifies what is feared. Within one year's time a union was certified, repudiated, 
the repudiation repudiated, and the repudiation of the repudiation repudiated. 
16 Southern Block and Pipe Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 590 (1950); Gottlieb and Co., 102 
N.L.R.B. 1708 (1953); Century Oxford Mfg. Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 835 (1943). 
17 Cases cited in note 5 supra. 
18 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954); Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 
296 (1949); NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co., (4th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 217; NLRB v. 
Andrew Jergens Co., (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 130. 
19 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d). 
20 Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 296 (1949); Marshall and Bruce Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 
90 (1947). 
21 Cases cited in note 5 supra. 
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will not outweigh the advantages of assuring employees complete 
freedom to choose their bargaining representative. It is true that 
the "good faith" bargaining test is already uncertain and difficult 
of application in specific cases. However, in the past the Board 
has not hesitated to apply that standard simply because it is in-
definite and often inexact. Cases in which the employer's good 
faith was examined are legion, and there is no reason to anticipate 
that the Board's experience in this area is inadequate. 
(4) It is urged that, as a practical matter, the rule is needed to 
promote stability and peace in industrial relations,22 and to mini-
mize strife resulting from raiding by outside unions.23 But it is 
doubtful whether lasting and peaceful industrial relationships are 
actually encouraged in a plant by preventing the employees from 
choosing freely their bargaining representative or by forcing them 
to accept as their bargaining agent a union which a majority of 
the employees do not desire to have represent them. As for the 
raiding argument, what would be the result of abandoning the 
rule? The rule can apply only if the employer bargains with the 
outside union after a majority of employees have chosen it, for 
an employer violates section 8 (a) (5) if he refuses to bargain with 
the certified union while it still has a majority,24 and he violates 
section 8 (a) (I) if he encourages the outside union in its organiza-
tional campaign or interferes with the certified union's attempt 
to retain its membership. Section 8 (b) (4) (C) prohibits the out-
side union from resorting to the pressures of collective action to 
gain bargaining rights while the inside union is certified. In such 
a case, the word "raiding" is hardly the term to describe what has 
actually happened. The employees have not been subjected to 
any unlawful pressure. After weighing the pros and cons of shift-
ing their affiliation, they have exercised the right expressly given 
them in sections 7 and 9 (a) to choose their own bargaining repre-
sentative. By hypothesis, the employer is neutralized, and the 
employees have freely expressed their desires after having heard 
and considered the merits of the change. Use of the one year 
certification rule freezes their bargaining status for a year, and 
in these circumstances would seem likely to incite just as much if 
not more unrest, discontent and instability than it quiets. 
22 NLRB v. Brooks, (9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 899; Mengel Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 705 
(1948); Henry Heide, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954); NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co., 
(4th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 217. 
23 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954). 
24Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817 (1944); NLRB v. P. 
Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 62 S.Ct. 397 (1942). 
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II. Conclusions 
Abandoning the rule might conceivably relieve an employer 
of a duty to bargain with any union in some cases. This could 
happen as follows: one month after a certification election a ma-
jority of employees by petition repudiate certified union A. Out-
side union B then claims to represent a majority of employees 
_in the bargaining unit. The employer states that he doubts 
whether either A or B actually represents a majority, and declines 
to bargain with either until one or the other is certified. Some 
cases have held that the employer can impose this condition prece-
dent to bargaining when he has good faith doubts as to a union's 
claim of majority status.25 As section 9 (c) (3) limits elections to 
one per year, no election could be held for eleven months, and the 
employer would then have no duty to bargain with either union 
A orB. 
The Board has never had to face this problem because the one 
year certification rule requires the employer to bargain with cer-
tified union A for a year regardless of loss of support. Many cases, 
however, have held that an employer cannot require certification 
as a condition precedent to bargaining when a union offers other 
reasonable proof of its majority standing.26 In such instances, the 
employer can have no "good faith doubt" of the union's status. 
If the one year certification rule were to be abandoned, this line of 
cases could be used to avoid the difficulty. The employer is re-
quired to bargain with the union representing a majority of the 
employees. Proof of majority status could be had without having 
an election by a Board comparison of authorization, membership, 
or check-off cards with the. employer's payroll. If a union could 
not submit such proof to the Board to substantiate its claims, it 
would seem to be a reasonable inference that it does not repre-
sent a majority and therefore is not entitled to act as bargaining 
representative. 
25 D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 876; Zall v. NLRB, (9th 
Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 499; Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 296 (1949); NLRB v 
Stewart, (5th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 8. 
26 NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., (9th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 7II (check of authorization 
cards "or any other quick procedure"); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 
185 F. (2d) 732 (membership cards); NLRB v. Kobritz, (5th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 8; 
United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950) (membership ledger); NLRB v. Geigy 
Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 2ll F. (2d) 553 (authorization cards); Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 
N.L.R.B. 728 (1950) (dues check-off cards); National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952) 
(participation in strike called by union). See generally the cases cited in I CCH LAB. L. 
REP., ,r3042.73 et seq. 
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Ultimately, the effect of the one year certification rule is to 
prevent temporarily an employee from withdrawing a union's au-
thority to bargain for him. Its justification can only be that it 
furthers the collective bargaining process by giving a union once 
certified as the proper bargaining agent a chance to establish a 
working relation with the employer. Admittedly, in many cases, 
it may substantially encourage the formation of sound collective 
bargaining relationships. As indicated above, however, the rule 
is not needed to prevent the employer from encouraging defection 
from the certified union, or to require an employer to bargain in 
good faith with the union in fact representing a majority of em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. If this is the case, suspension of 
the power to change bargaining representatives during the certifi-
cation year in order to promote collective bargaining runs squarely 
against the "section 7 right" of employees "to bargain collectively 
through agents of their own choosing." Section 9 (a) provides that 
"representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees ... shall be the 
exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit." The 
one year certification rule modifies this to read that "representa-
tives certified for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
Board . .. shall be the exclusive representative for one year of all 
employees in such unit."27 Likewise section 8 (a) (5) obligates an 
employer "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees." But the effect of the one year rule is to require the 
employer "to bargain for one year with the certified union, 
whether representing a majority of his employees or not." 
The one year certification rule is not expressly mentioned in 
the statute and is the result of Board practice. When a rule of 
such origin detracts from statutory rights and modifies duties 
expressly imposed by statute, it is difficult to justify. A labor or-
ganization exists for the benefit of the employees whom it repre-
sents, and its rights are designed to allow it to make that represen-
tation effective. These rights should accrue from the fact that it 
represents a majority of employees and not from the fact that it 
is certified as representing a majority of them when in fact this 
is no longer true. Yet the one year rule emphasizes the fact of 
certification and not the fact of actual representation of a majority 
of employees, to the derogation of the express statutory right of 
those employees to choose their bargaining representatives. 
27 Italics supplied. 
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